Their articles have appeared in at least two of the journals, and at least one of their articles has been published during the past decade. So in that sense, the list is a tool for exploration, not just confirmation. For instance, there are anthropologists and economists who make important contributions to the field, but publish primarily in discipline-specific journals.
And some migration scholars, like Alan Gamlen, Elzbieta Gozdziak, and Peter Scholten, have been busy running or setting up their own migration journals. And the six people based in Asia are all working in countries of immigration. This geographical bias continues to be a major challenge for migration research. Here are the names listed by country, with hyperlinks to the alpabetical list below.
Some of the publications are co-authored with others. Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement? Did you read the caveats and see that I mention you specifically? I did!
You got us talking. If you want to continue this kind of analysis-which I think is very worthy—I think the focus should not be on individual scholars, but for example on the geographies and disciplines from which migration scholars come, gender and age of authors, etc.. I think Russell King did something like that for JEMS to see if they published people from all over the world or from selected places.
Thanks for these good points. I will indeed continue this a bit more thoroughly in another format, and will have your input in mind. If we go further down, and make the analysis by country, I think we could also find out that the countries where the worth knowing migration scholars are based are very few. I thing that one of the reasons for these is that only SSCI indexed journals were used in the analysis.
Yes, this was surprising to me too. I think it reflects the unfortunate divide between anglophone and francophone literatures. Are there other francophone journals that focus exclusively on migration issues, which I should conider? I would love to read this post, but unfortunately I am unable to view the content.
I can only see the image and the comments. Could anybody help me with that? A second problem is the diversity of national and religious backgrounds of entrepreneurially oriented groups. Among minorities with high rates of business ownership, we find Jews and Arabs, southern and northern Europeans, Asians, Middle Easterners, and some Latin Americans. This theoretical untidiness is compounded by other groups of similar cultural or religious origins that are not significantly represented among business owners. Why, for example, are Chinese Buddhists so prone to entrepreneurship, but not Buddhist Cambodians?
Why Catholic Cubans, but not Catholic Mexicans? A theory that must invent an ad hoc story for each instance of success and for each exception ends up explaining nothing. For this reason, sociologists and other social scientists have moved away from exclusively culturalistic theories to focus on the structure of opportunities and concrete sets of skills characteristic of diverse groups and affecting their economic behavior. A series of such theories have been advanced but, in the end, the most persuasive is the one that pairs business skills brought from the home country with a positive mode of incorporation.
Entrepreneurial know-how represents a particular form of human capital, not a religious ethic or set of distinct cultural values. Such skills can and have been found among immigrants raised in very different cultures. It is true that difficulties with the host country language and racial or ethnic discrimination represent significant incentives for self-employment but, by themselves, these and other disadvantages will not lead to the consolidation of a strong business community Bonacich and Modell ; Light and Bonacich It is only when business skills have been accumulated by a sizable number before immigration and when the receiving social and political context allows its deployment that the rise of an entrepreneurial community can be expected Raijman On the contrary, when an immigrant group is composed primarily of low-skilled workers or when, by dial of unauthorized status or other negatively evaluated characteristics it confronts an unfavorable mode of incorporation, only a feeble set of enterprises catering mainly to the co-ethnic community can be expected.
The theory can predict as well the rise and consolidation of ethnic enterprises and business collectives among contemporary migrants endowed with the requisite human capital and mode of incorporation. At the opposite end, it partially explains why other major immigrant minorities such as Cambodians, Laotians, Haitians, and Mexicans have not developed a strong business presence Telles and Ortiz ; Zhou et al.
There used to be a time when the literature on immigration and immigrant assimilation viewed the move as a one-way flight from misery and hopelessness, followed by a protracted effort at integration into the host society no longer. Starting in the early s, a novel perspective brought to the fore the continuing and multiple relations sustained by immigrants with their home localities and nations.
The study of ethnic entrepreneurship was affected by the new perspective in various ways: first, the character of business development in the host and home countries; second, the loss of human capital accompanying entrepreneurial out-migration; third, the counter flow of resources in the form of immigrant transnational investments and knowledge transfers. We review each of these developments in turn. A series of studies in the USA have found that the character and the very existence of many immigrant firms depend on their regular contacts with their country of origin Guarnizo et al.
These contacts, in turn, facilitate certain forms of business development in home country localities. In their detailed study of transnational ties among Salvadoran immigrants in the Los Angeles and Washington D. Circuit enterprises are the archetype of the transnational firms since they sustain the flow of material resources and information between the country of origin and its expatriate communities. In El Salvador, they range from informal travelers or viajeros who move back and forth delivering money and goods to large formal firms, like El Gigante Express, that performs similar functions on a large scale.
Cultural enterprises exploit the desire among expatriates to consume news and cultural products from their home country. Ethnic enterprises include restaurants, food stores, clothing stores, and others that source their supplies abroad and cater both to an ethnic clientele and to mainstream clients. It is not uncommon that ethnic enterprises import foodstuffs and other goods from more than one country. Migrant return enterprises are the product of investments back home by former migrants who transfer not only capital, but know-how acquired abroad. These firms frequently pioneer in lines of business not seen before in the home countries, thus exploiting the informational advantage of migrant entrepreneurs.
In El Salvador, they include fax and photocopy stores, Internet access stands, pizza parlors and restaurants with home delivery, automated car washes, English language schools, and sporting goods stores. Transnational firms in expansion are established firms in home countries that come to perceive the expatriate communities as a new business opportunity and a platform for expansion into broader markets.
The Constancia bottling company in El Salvador has a plant in Los Angeles to produce its beer and soft drinks both for the co-ethnic market and the larger Latino community of the area. There are actually two types or levels of transnational enterprises: those initiated by immigrants of modest education and resources and those created by migrant professionals.
The firms created by Salvadoran, Dominican, and Mexican immigrants described by Landolt et al. At the other end, are firms founded by Israeli, Indian, Taiwanese, and other professionals that include information technologies, large scale import—export houses, and financial services of various kinds Gold ; Hart and Acs ; Agarwala This type of firm is not only found in ethnic enclaves, but throughout the mainstream economy.
Their size and economic heft has attracted the attention of sending country states, as we will see below. As Zhou has noted, regardless of size, transnational enterprises depend for their operation of social networks across space. Bounded solidarity and trust stemming from a common national origin underlies many instances of risk-taking across borders. In this sense, social capital supplements or even takes the place of scarce money capital, at least at the start of migrant businesses. Like migration itself, social networks facilitate and are, in turn, strengthened by the emergence of these enterprises Massey ; Tilly ; Guarnizo et al.
Lastly the empirical literature has unearthed a previously unnoticed characteristic of immigrant entrepreneurship. Although business owners have always represented a minority of their respective ethnic communities, the majority of them depend on transnational links for the viability and success of their firms.
These links facilitate access to everything—from sources of capital to sources of labor, as well as access to competitively priced goods. The counterpart of the finding that the success of immigrant enterprises depends largely on certain forms of human capital brought by migrants to the country of destination is the question of the effects that such outflows have on sending nations.
Naturally, a first reaction is to regard such movements as a net loss, compounding the disadvantages of poor countries in an increasingly competitive world. For a long time, professional and entrepreneurial migrations were analysed through these lenses: less developed countries invested scarce resources in the training of young professionals only to see them move abroad after completion of their studies.
Mid-income countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Turkey, Egypt, and India are particularly susceptible to this loss because they possess sufficient resources to train their students in advanced science, engineering, business administration, and other fields, but not to employ gainfully many of them upon graduation. The relative deprivation that these young professionals experience as they compare their lot to their peers in developed countries creates a mass of disposable talent, easily hired by firms and universities of the advanced world.
In this fashion, less developed nations end up subsidizing richer ones, although deepening their own underdevelopment. The main problem with these theories is that they overlook the tendency of most immigrant workers and professionals alike, to remain in close touch with the places they came from. Like their theoretical cousin, the classical theory of assimilation, the orthodox portrayal of the brain drain assumes that, once these fortunate individuals leave their countries, they never look back.
This does not happen. As seen previously, the longer adult immigrants have resided abroad and the better established they have become, the more likely they are to involve themselves in activities concerning their home nations. Their multiple transnational projects have fueled technological and economic development back home to an extent unanticipated only a few years ago Leung ; Agarwala ; Zhou and Lee Such bi-national flows have been characterized by two features. Put differently, return professional migration possesses both structural importance for the sending economies and significant change potential for both sending and receiving regions.
This potential is greater in the home countries because it can alter both their value systems and their skill repertoires, but it also can affect the institutional framework supporting technological entrepreneurship in the receiving societies Zhou and Lee The usual recommendation ensuing from traditional analyses of the brain drain is for source nations to try and repatriate their professionals.
This solution rarely works because sending countries can seldom compete in terms of salaries or work conditions with those where their expatriates now live. To the contrary, the transnational perspective highlights the key point that immigrant professional can, if they choose, transform permanent migration into a cyclical pattern through deliberate use of rapidly developing communication and transportation technologies. Indian engineers in Silicon Valley, Chinese software programmers in Boston and Filipino doctors everywhere can continue living and working in the USA while conducting a steady stream of exchanges and investments in their own countries.
This is a direct reflection, at the personal level, of the compression of space brought about by the new technologies and the growing connectedness of the global economic system Guarnizo Figure 2 portrays the dynamics at play. A partial exception to the transnational trend among expatriate professionals is the case of political refugees. Communications and investments in their home country are commonly blocked because of their opposition to the dominant regime. Although exceptions to this pattern have been detected here and there, the main result is that nations forcing their educated citizens to flee effectively lose the significant developmental potential associated with their know-how and economic resources.
Refugee communities in this situation tend to concentrate in consolidating their economic position abroad. If they possess a substantial entrepreneurial and professional presence, the result is normally the emergence of an ethnic business enclave. As indicated before, theories about the positive effects of self-employment on the economic well-being of immigrant and ethnic groups have been buttressed by national-level data from the s and s. In this section, we explore the question of whether such theories hold in the twenty-first century as well.
The latest data, for , are presented in Table 1.
By Abdelmalek Sayad. Ever since then, the popular image of Calcutta has been that of a giant urban black hole: overcrowded, hot, filthy. Some were 'displaced persons' and refugees from war-torn Europe; they included women from Poland, Hungary, Greece, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States. If they possess a substantial entrepreneurial and professional presence, the result is normally the emergence of an ethnic business enclave. A crucial factor may have been the public role accorded to women.
It shows the number of firms owned by selected immigrant nationalities and native minorities, the number of such firms per 1, population, and their aggregate and per-firm business receipts. A useful feature of these data is that it separates firms without employees and those with at least one employee. The first type comes closer to the definition of self-employment as an economic survival strategy; whereas the second corresponds more accurately to its definition as a vehicle for economic mobility. If we focus first on the total number of firms, Cubans appear as the most business-oriented group, followed by Koreans and Chinese.
However, if we consider firm size, as indicated by gross receipts per capita, Asian Indian enterprises emerge as the largest, followed by Korean firms. Cuban enterprises are smaller, suggesting that they are mostly created for economic survival. At the bottom, under both criteria, are Filipino, Mexican, and African American enterprises. Filipinos, a highly educated group, have mostly opted for the professional salaried route in lieu of autonomous enterprise. The figures for Mexicans and African Americans reflect, on the other hand, the position of both minorities at the bottom of the economic ladder.
Notice that, in absolute terms, Mexican and African American firms are the most numerous, but these figures are swamped by the size of their respective populations. If we turn now to firms with employees, we notice at once that they are much larger in terms of gross receipts. Koreans are at the top of this league in terms of firms per thousand population, followed by Indians. As a highly educated group, Indians combine the professional salaried route with sizable entrepreneurial investments.
Their economic resources and human capital insure that their firms become vehicles for accumulation, rather than just survival. Cubans present a paradoxical picture, being one of the groups least represented in the category of enterprises with employees, but having the second largest firms in terms of receipts per firms. Figures for this group on the left and right sides of Table 1 reflect its bifurcation between the earlier upper and middle class exiles that arrived in the s and s, and subsequent refugee waves that came after the chaotic Mariel exodus of Portes and Stepick ; Nijman Earlier exiles were responsible for the emergence of the flourishing enclave economy in Miami, anchored by large and mid-size firms.
These earlier generations are now dying off and have been increasingly replaced by less-educated refugees who, although also entrepreneurially inclined, lack the resources to create anything more than single-person businesses. The large number of such firms on the left side of the table and the small relative number of established Cuban firms on the right reflect these demographic trends.
African Americans, Filipinos, and Mexicans are least represented in the category of better-established enterprises, although Mexicans have the largest absolute number of such firms. Again, these absolute numbers are swamped by the large size of the Mexican population. The data in this table paint a complex picture that suggests different entrepreneurial paths governed by the resources, histories, and context of reception of various ethnic and immigrant minorities.
It provides information on an array of personal variables—including education, occupation, and income—that can be, in turn, broken down by national origins and ethnicity. Table 2 presents data for the self-employment rates, annual incomes, and hourly incomes for native whites, African Americans, and ten immigrant groups. These groups include the three largest Mexicans, Chinese, and Indians ; the three most entrepreneurial in terms of self-employment rates Israelis, Iranians, and Koreans ; three among the least entrepreneurial Mexicans, Dominicans, and Jamaicans ; and two of the largest refugee groups Cubans and Vietnamese.
The sample is restricted to adult males in the civilian labor force. Employment type and incomes for native and selected immigrant groups, a. Figures in the table are adjusted using person-level analytical weights. Self-employment is defined in two categories—general and incorporated. The first category includes all types of enterprises—from personal survival ventures to established firms. The second more closely reflects the latter type.
A first anticipated finding is that the immigrant self-employment rate exceeds that of natives, although this is due to the low rate among African Americans; native whites are at par with immigrants on this score. Regardless of whether a broad or restricted definition of entrepreneurship is adopted, the same rank order obtains among immigrant groups—with Israelis, Iranians, and Koreans consistently on top and Mexicans and Dominicans at the bottom.
Self-employment rates among these last groups still exceed, by a considerable margin, that of the largest native minority African Americans. Annual income figures confirm results from census data of the s and s: the self-employed earn more on average, both among natives and among immigrants. This finding holds, for the most part, for both definitions of self-employment although there are exceptions when the general unrestricted definition is considered. When restricted to incorporated businesses, the only exception are Jamaicans: whether average income for a particular group is above the national average—as among Indians, Iranians, and Chinese—or below—as among Dominicans and Mexicans—established business owners tend to earn significantly more.
Exactly the same result obtains when we consider mean hourly earnings. This last finding provides an authoritative rebuttal to the argument that higher annual incomes among entrepreneurs are due to higher work effort in terms of hours worked Bates Self-employment turns out to be more profitable both by the year and by the hour. Table 3 presents results of a regression analysis of annual incomes on the usual set of human capital predictors plus self-employment and national origins. The left-most columns of Table 3 present results using a broad definition of self-employment; the right-most columns use a definition restricted to incorporated businesses.
The models use real dollars rather than logged dollars as the dependent variable for reasons explained previously. Nationality variables use native whites as the reference category. Results reproduce the familiar effects of human capital on incomes. For comparison, this effect quadruples that of work experience, as indexed by age. These findings confirm those reported for earlier census years, indicating the positive overall effect of entrepreneurship on the economic well-being of immigrant groups.
Finally, Table 4 presents parallel regressions, this time with average hourly income as the dependent variable. These results again address the objection that higher economic rewards for entrepreneurs are a result of their extra work effort. All other effects run parallel to those described previously.
It is worth noting that when self-employment enters the equation, many nationality effects—including those associated with entrepreneurial groups like Koreans, Chinese, and Cubans—turn negative or insignificant for both annual and hourly incomes. This indicates that whatever economic advantage these immigrant groups possess on average, it is largely due to their participation in independent business ventures.
Exceptions are Israelis, Iranians, and Indians—groups with extraordinarily high levels of human capital—which, as seen previously, also allows them to derive high incomes from salaried employment. Despite a dip brought about by the great economic downturn of —10, immigration is likely to continue and grow in future years, driven by the structural need of the American economy for both manual and highly qualified labor, plus the dense transnational networks created by people across space.
In this context, it makes every sense to inquire about the best path for occupational and economic incorporation for immigrants and their descendants. With much reason, standard econometric and sociometric models of minority employment and income zero in on the human capital endowment of different groups. This is a crucial factor, but certainly not the only one. As the previous findings show, even groups with relatively modest average education can move ahead economically. The key factor is entrepreneurship.
Advantages accruing to an ethnic community by virtue of widespread business development extend beyond the economic success of individual business owners.